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EVOLUTION, BIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY FROM A MARXIST POINT OF VIEW

by Robert M. Young

Marx and Engels admired Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection, because it provided a unified, naturalistic, materialist account of nature, life and human nature, but they also saw it as a prime example of the penetration of ideology into knowledge. When he first read Darwin, Marx wrote to Engels in 1860 that ‘although it is developed in the crude English style, this is the book which contains the basis in natural history for our view’ (Marx and Engels, 1954, p. 171). He added in 1862, ‘It is remarkable how Darwin recognises among beasts and plants his English society with its division of labour, competition, opening up of new markets, "inventions", and the Malthusian "struggle for existence"’ (Marx & Engels, 1955, p. 128). Engels wrote, ‘Darwin did not know what a bitter satire he wrote on mankind, and especially on his countrymen, when he showed that free competition, the struggle for existence, which the economists celebrate as the highest historical achievement, is the normal state of the animal kingdom’. He added that only ‘conscious organisation of social production’ could lift humankind above the animal world (Engels, 1873-86, pp. 35-6).

This ambivalence has recurred throughout the history of Marxism, so no single, unified account can be given of the Marxist approach to biology, evolution and psychology. The linking of humanity to biology through evolution is bound to be a feature of a theory which is based on the attempt to provide a unified, materialist account of all that is. However, one aspect of this account is its claim that the ruling ideas of a period are based on the ideas of the ruling class. A consequence of trying to hold both of these ideas at once is that the critique of the ideological role of knowledge reflexively threatens to undermine any settled basis for knowledge. This tension can be characterised as that between dialectical and historical materialism. It is Marxism’s version of the deep, ubiquitous question of the relationship between nature and history (see, e.g., Schmidt, 1971, p. 49; Ollman, 1971, p. 53.)

It is a consequence of this unresolved conundrum that it can be argued that there are two main strands in the Marxist tradition, one which stresses the penetration of ideological categories into accounts of nature and human nature, and another which asserts that nature per se obeys laws which are dialectical. These can be characterised as the humanistic and the diamat (for dialectical materialist) strands. There is a third strand, positivism, wherein nominally Marxist thinkers simply identified materialism with the contemporary state of natural science and technology and sought to be good at them. This approach was characteristic of the Second International, influenced communist and socialist parties well beyond 1914 and also produced the remarkable achievements of the Soviet Union in science and technology, in particular, nuclear weapons, satellites and other forms of military technology. A fourth — structuralist — strand emerged in the 1960s. It was formalistic and led eventually to deconstructionism, postmodernism (Theory, Culture & Society, 1988; Jameson, 1991; Docherty, 1993), extreme scepticism about grand narratives (Rorty, 1980, 1982, 1989) and cynicism about utopian projects. This had the consequence of abandoning any serious connection between those who trod this path and a recognisably Marxist approach or project (Callinicos, 1989; Best and Kellner, 1991).

 

The founding document of the humanistic strand is Marx’s The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, and its principal exponents were the Georg Lukács of History and Class Consciousness (1923) and Antonio Gramsci, who thought deeply about the concepts of matter and nature in his Prison Notebooks , for example, ‘The idea of "objective’ in metaphysical materialism would appear to me an objectivity that exists even apart from man; but when one affirms that a reality would exist even if man did not, one is either speaking metaphorically or one is falling into a form of mysticism. We know reality only in relation to man, and since man is historical becoming, knowledge and reality are also becoming and so is objectivity, etc.’ (Gramsci, 1925-31, p. 446; cf. pp. 465-66). The central theses of this approach are that nature is a societal category and human nature is an ensemble of social relations (Schmidt, 1972; Berry, 1986). Lukács wrote, ‘Nature is a societal category. That is to say, whatever is held to be natural at any given stage of social development, however this nature is related to man and whatever form his involvement with it takes, i.e., nature’s form, its content, its range and its objectivity are all socially conditioned’ (1923, p. 234). There is an ongoing debate about whether or not this approach embraces the findings of natural science as well (see Young, 1973, esp. pp. 241-45, 1977, 1985b; RSJ Collective, 1981)

Marxism focuses on the social determinants of human nature, so much so that many Marxists argue that there is no need for a separate discipline concerned with the individual, since the possessive individualism at the heart of bourgeois social theory is seen as a specific ideological product of the capitalist mode of production. This might lead one to think that Marxists would be very active in social psychology, but this is not the case. (but see Wexler, 1983). Critics of Soviet Marxism in its Stalinist manifestations have accused it of seeking to destroy the individual with a crushing collectivist conformism (Koestler, 1940; Orwell, 1949; Marcuse, 1958; Solzhenitsyn, 1973, 1975, 1978). All of this goes against the spirit of the original Marxist vision. As Marx and Engels put it in ‘The Communist Manifesto’, ‘In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition of the free development of all’ (Marx and Engels, 1848, p. 87).

The concepts of alienation, commodity fetishism, reification and false consciousness recur throughout the Marxist tradition. In the capitalist relations of production the worker is alienated from the means of production, the product, his or her fellow workers and species being (Ollman, 1971). The commodity form leads to a fetishism, whereby relations between people are treated as relations between things (Marx, 1867, pp. 163-77; see also Part 4, chs. 14, 15), and human relations are thereby reified (‘thingified’; Lukács, 1923, pp. 83-222). The concept of false consciousness makes the point that people’s subjective sense of their motives and intentions are likely — for reasons of class location — to be a long way from an awareness of the objective, structural causes which determine their thought and action. A further characteristic of most of the literature in the Marxist tradition is that it is critique; hence, most of its views on nature and human nature are critical rather than part of a fully worked out alternative framework of ideas..

The founding document of the diamat strand is Engels’ Dialectics of Nature (1873-86), and its central thesis is that the laws of nature are dialectical and therefore take the fundamental form of thesis, antithesis and synthesis and that, in the end, nature is what Marxists hope it is. Dialectical materialism evolved from a set of principles laid down by Marx and Engels to a formulaic set of rules which were applied to all forms of thought (Wetter, 1952; Jordan, 1967). I am presenting this approach in a caricatured form, since its most dedicated exponents involved Soviet science and technology — especially biology and agriculture — in ideological excesses which were very intellectually and economically costly. In particular, the baleful influence of T. D. Lysenko (who professed to be a disciple of the eminent breeder, I. V. Michurin and represented his ideas and policies as ‘Michurinism’; see Michurin, 1949; Stoletov, 1953) in the biological sciences and on crop cultivation, precluded the Soviet Union from playing any significant part in these disciplines for decades, the very decades in which the dramatic developments in nucleotide chemistry and x-ray crystallography led to the discovery of the structure of DNA and the genetic alphabet (It is ironic that much of it was inspired by the research and influence of the British Marxist crystallographer and polymath, J. D. Bernal, several of whose students became Nobel Laureates; see Goldsmith, 1980; Young, 1980).

It would not be worth going into Lysenko’s ideas here about how plants develop and pass on their characteristics. Although not derived from Lamarckian ideas, he stressed their affinity to the notion that acquired characteristics could be inherited, an idea completely at odds with the basic assumptions of modern genetics. Moreover, in Lysenko’s writings plants were said to struggle and co-operate and obey laws of heredity which were wholly discredited throughout the scientific world. The followers of his teachings treated seeds in special ways (‘vernalization’) and planted them in large groups; most perished (for the sake of the others!), and the waste was colossal. The waste of scientific talent was, too, since those who did not follow the party line — Stalin backed Lysenko, showered honours on him and made his power almost absolute in science — were sent to work camps in the Gulag Archipelago (Joravsky, 1961, 1970; Medvedev, 1969).

All of Soviet biology and medicine were, indeed, affected by this gross ideological distortion. Its assumptions appealed to the authorities, because it stressed environmental influences and the malleability of nature. Michurinism claimed that ‘It is possible, with man’s intervention, to force any form of animal or plant to change more quickly and in a direction desirable to man. There opens up before man a broad field of activity of the greatest value to him.’ By the time of Lysenko’s ascendency in 1948, when Stalin endorsed his ideas, the slogan ‘the transformation of nature’ became the basis of a whole programme (Lysenko, 1948; Zirkle, 1949; Graham, 1971, pp. 234, 235, 237). The claims for success of Lysenkoist procedures and ideas became fantastic, as is evidenced from the writings of the sycophantic winner of the Stalin Prize in 1949: Land in Bloom, by V. Safonov, which concludes by saying that Michurin science ‘must become the pivot of all the natural sciences’, that all of science was being reorganised in the wake of the 1948 congress. ‘An unprecedented wave of enthusiasm swept through the ranks’ of all sorts of scientists ‘Not a small group of scientists, but the entire country was promoting Michurin science, the science of man’s power over the land and of the transformation of the land for the benefit of the people. It was a revolution in science’ (Safonov, 1951, pp. 541-2).

Marxism has an ontology based on the concept of labour, expressed in the notion of praxis. It was being applied here in the context of massive efforts at willed change, attempting to bring a vast, fledgling capitalist country, with huge peasant (formerly serf) population, into a leading role among nations in a hostile international context. Stalinism tried to force nature and human nature; both turned out to be refractory. No textbooks of genetics were published from 1938 to the early 1960s; no genetics was taught to medical students in this period. Scientists in the West who supported the Soviet regime, for example, J. B. S. Haldane (1948, 1949) and J. D. Bernal (1949, 1952-3), were placed in deeply embarrassing positions (Werskey, 1978, pp. 292-304). Attempts have been made by a later generation of Marxists to salvage something from this debacle (Lewontin & Levins, 1976, 1985; Lecourt, 1977; Young, 1978). The lesson to be learned from this episode is that, even though the ruling ideas of an epoch — including its deepest assumptions about nature — are derived from the ideas of the ruling class, if a regime seeks to dictate the categories of science with too much voluntarist precision, the result will be nonsense. The Soviet physicists stood up to the authorities and were able to deliver the knowledge, technology and weapons which made the Soviet Union a formidable adversary, though it eventually bankrupted them.

Something similar happened in Soviet psychology (Joravsky, 1989), but the consequence was, for the most part, a choice of explanatory paradigm rather than a distortion of scientific method. That is, the Soviet regime hit on the work of the distinguished experimentalist I. P. Pavlov (1927; Wells, 1956) and his concept of the conditioned reflex and made this the cornerstone of its official psychology. Once again, the focus was on changing human nature by means of habit or repeated external stimuli, paired through repetition with physiological processes. It could be said that there was no psychology per se: everything had to be expressed in terms of reflexes and higher nervous functions. The result was not so much to stifle science as to ensure that all work was reported in the rhetoric of the official paradigm. In fact, Soviet studies of the nervous system and of brain function produced some subtle, classical work, for example, that of A. R. Luria on severely brain damaged patients (Luria, 1932, 1962, 1968, 1973. 1979). Western techniques of behavioural control, F. W. Taylor’s scientific management of the labour process, for example, were eagerly taken up (Lenin, 1918, pp. 417-18). It could be argued that much of Soviet work discipline — extending from the school and factory to the use of psychiatry as a form of social control to the labour camps in the Gulag Archipelago — was a particularly coercive form of applied psychology: voluntarist rhetoric about building socialism coupled with pure fear.

In the theoretical versions of academic psychology two principles predominated: learning from habit and explanation in materialist terms. These reflected the environmentalism and belief in the plasticity of nature and human nature adopted by the Soviets, as well as the requirement that all explanations should be expressed in terms of materialist processes. The result was conditioned reflexes and explanation in terms of the functions of the nervous system. Needless to say, hypothetical constructs, such as the ‘second signalling system’, could proliferate here, just as they could in the West’s nominally reductionist behaviorism, where ‘hypothetical constructs’ and ‘intervening variables’ filled the gaps in the reductionists’ explanations (U.S. Dept., 1950). On the other hand, after a period of some uncertainty, psychoanalysis was declared anathema and was officially dead after 1930 (Roudinesco, 1990, pp. 35-42).

Aside from the object lesson of Soviet science, the Marxist ideas of nature and human nature which are most interesting derive from Western Marxism, in particular from the ideas of a small number of thinkers associated with the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory and subsequent writers influenced by them (Jay, 1973). Foremost among these were Wilhelm Reich, Herbert Marcuse and Erich Fromm. One could say that they all took as their starting point the question of how the Germans could have allowed a fascist regime to be democratically elected and establish a dictatorship. What they had in common, at least in the 1930s, was a profound belief in ideology as a material force in the deepest layers of the unconscious. All were thinking within the framework of psychoanalysis, although Marcuse was not a clinician.

Reich believed that all that stood between oppressed people and a return to a spontaneous, sexually liberated way of being was the removal of repression. He made a searching study of how mass psychology propagated authoritarianism through the generations and through the workplace and the family. One could say that his diagnosis was profound, but his therapy was utopian and simplistic in the extreme. De-repression was all. He wrote a series of excellent essays and pamphlets between 1929 and 1934 (Reich, 1972), culminating in his classic, The Mass Psychology of Fascism (1933). Thereafter he became increasingly preoccupied with the idea that sexual energy or libido took a physical form, which he called orgone, and he set out to find it, accumulate it and increase its manifestations and benefits in people. He managed to outrage both the psychoanalytic and the communist authorities and was expelled from both organisations. (Orthodox psychoanalysis has never been tolerant of radicals and Marxists; see Jacoby, 1983.) Reich wandered about Europe for a time and ended up in America, where he was first a guru in a utopian community then was arrested and imprisoned for contravening federal regulations in the course of his research on orgone and the causes and cure of cancer. By this time he believed that he could accumulate orgone in boxes which he sold. He died in prison in an advanced state of paranoia. In spite of his tragic later life, Reich’s analyses of the mediations of authoritarianism in the lives and unconscious of people remain important (I. Reich, 1969; Sharaf, 1983). On the other hand, his attempt to construe libidinal energy as a measurable and controllable material phenomenon led to nonsense.

Marcuse’s most insightful writings in psychology are Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Enquiry into Freud (1955) and One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Societies (1964), He refined his thinking in shorter essays: An Essay on Liberation (1969b) and Five Lectures (1970). Marcuse took as his starting point the classical libido theory of Freud and accepted the dual instinct theory (which Reich rejected) of Eros and Thanatos — the struggle between loving and destructive forces in the personality. In particular, he believed that these were genuinely instinctual, which set him apart from Reich (who only ontologised libido) and Fromm (who was opposed to what he considered Marcuse’s instinctual reductionism). Where Reich placed his faith in de-repression, Marcuse believed that there is a deep instinctual integrity in human nature, a fundamentally rebellious impulse which would refuse to be smashed flat by oppressive forces in capitalist societies. He called this ‘the great refusal’. Marcuse applied his approach to the history of capitalism and extended it to a deep critique of advanced capitalist societies and their intellectual, scientific and social systems. In particular, he took a number of Freudian notions and historicised them. To the reality principle, which he considered to be universal, he added the historically contingent ‘performance principle’, an extra requirement of conformism which is specific to a given period. To the universal need for repression to ensure civilisation, he added the ‘surplus repression’ of authoritarian societies, with their ersatz sexual liberation in ‘repressive desublimation’ of girlie magazines and the like. This had a counterpart in the political realm in his idea of ‘repressive tolerance’, a set of liberal practices which had the deeper function of maintaining the status quo (Marcuse, 1969a). He also argued that mass society was eroding the role of the father and the Freudian superego and increasingly controlling the individual directly by the media and education. These ideas were very influential in the student movement of the 1960s in Europe and America. Marcuse’s criticisms of class politics estranged him from the organised Left, but his critique of the ideological construction of reality in advanced capitalist society remains fresh and trenchant.

Erich Fromm’s essays in the 1930s (1971) and his most admired text, Fear of Freedom (1941) were, like the writings of Reich and Marcuse, helpful in illuminating the rise of fascism and the failure of liberal democracy to stand up to it. However, after he emigrated to America and then to Mexico, his successive books became more and more romantic, voluntarist and open to criticism by Marxists, until Marcuse (1969, Postscript) openly rejected his work because of its departure from the libido theory, which distanced Fromm from the biological basis of Freudianism, and others labelled it as romantic and idealist. However, Fromm’s writings gained a wide audience, in particular, The Art of Loving (1956) and The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (1974). He continued to consider himself a Marxist, but his excursions into extreme versions of Marxist humanism and romanticism took him beyond the pale as far as most Marxists were concerned.

There was a rash of Marxist psychology books and essays in the 1970s, all attempting to demonstrate how the prevailing social forces acted by structural causality to shape the thoughts and personalities of people. (Ingleby, 1970; Zaretsky, 1973; Schneider, 1975; Lichtman, 1982). Two writers in this genre are of particular interest. The first, Joel Kovel, provided a history of White Racism (1970), followed by The Age of Desire (1982) and a series of increasingly sophisticated essays (1988). Reich had been an early influence, but Kovel was more and more attracted by Marcuse but with the added advantage of being a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst. He eventually came to feel that neither Marxism nor psychoanalysis reach the deepest level of human nature, the level of spirituality, which he felt should be salvaged from the Judeo-Christian tradition and drew on liberation theology to supply what he considered to be the missing level of human nature (1991).

Victor Wolfenstein has made contributions to the Marxist analysis of human nature which are, in my opinion, nonpareil. His biographical study of Malcolm X (1981) is a profound synthesis of the unconscious and the socio-historical influences on his mind and life, while his Psychoanalytic-Marxism (1993) is the most searching and clear exploration of the issues involved in treating the unconscious and the socio-economic aspects of human nature without collapsing either into the other.

In Partisans in an Uncertain World: The Psychoanalysis of Engagement, Paul Hoggett (1992) reflects of the problems posed by the failure of the political project of left libertarianism in the 1960s and 1970s and returns to the writings of Klein, Bion and Winnicott to re-found socialist politics on the basis of a deeper understanding of the internal obstacles to liberation. My own Mental Space (1994) covers similar ground but focuses on the problem of ways of thinking about mind in a Cartesian world view based on mind-body dualism and explores the contributions of the Kleinian tradition in psychoanalysis and group relations and Winnicott’s concept of the transitional, as compared with the reifications of neo-Freudianism. Particular attention is paid to racism and virulent nationalism. Both of these books seek to make explicit what we are up against in human nature — individual, group and institutional — when we seek to change the world.

Turning to a broader view of ideas of evolution and human nature, the writings of Karl Figlio, Donna Haraway, along with my own, have sought to unite analyses of the concept of nature in medicine and biology, with careful studies of how ideology operates as a material force in the realm of theory. Figlio (1978, 1979, 1985) has concentrated on the ideological determination of medical concepts and of disease categories. I have focused on science and ideology in general and in the history of evolutionary theory as it bears on ideas of human nature (1971, 1973, 1973a, 1977, 1985, 1985a, 1985b, 1992). Haraway (1989) has provided a magisterial study of the ideological determinations of primate studies, as they construct a pedigree for the concept of humanity and the family which suits the prevailing mores and current epochal forces in the history of capitalism. The greatest strength of this work lies in the care and precision with which she traces the determinations and their interrelations — ideological, economic, institutional, personal relationships, patronage, gender, government, international relations, etc. She has gone beyond this in offering a vision of a liberatory science, including feminism, cyborgs and a postmodern space which transcends the current notions of scientific practice (Haraway, 1990, 1992; see also Young, 1992).

The work of Figlio, Haraway and Young fall under the rubric of ‘social constructivism’ in the history, philosophy and social studies of science, an approach which owes something to Marxism and something else to other, less radical, approaches to knowledge, some of which are considered to be relativist about epistemology. They have some things in common with traditional studies in these disciplines. They have other things in common with an approach which is also socially constructivist but concentrates on the ways in which social, economic and ideological determinations are inscribed on human subjects. There have been several phases of this approach. One which flourished in the 1970s threw up periodicals which explored the role of structural causes at work in the psychology of individuals, e.g., Ideology and Consciousness, and on to the publication of collections and monographs developing this approach, e.g., Changing the Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity (Henriques et al., 1984) and Nikolas Rose’s Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self (1989). Another facet was the journal M/F, which was preoccupied with the interrelations among masculinity/feminism, Marx/Freud. (I make no attempt to summarise the marxist-feminist-psychoanalytic or the related Lacanian literatures (see Mitchell, 1974; Rose, 1986; 1993; Soble, 1986; Brennan, 1989) or the developments from Marxism to dissident sexuality (Dollimore, 1991; Giddens, 1992; Squires, 1993))

A latter phase of this tendency found itself interpreting the determinations of individuality in a deconstructionist way. In some hands, this has led to the dissolution of any abiding sense of human nature or of the subject (Barsky, 1989; Frosh, 1991; Giddens, 1990, 1992). This takes us to the heart of postmodernism and, in my opinion, to pessimism and the danger of despair (Appignanesi, 1989; Young, 1989). Much of this work has occurred under the influence of the study of language and the conceptions of the episteme of a period and of power which have been elaborated by Michel Foucault (Macey, 1993). Much else has been influenced by Louis Althusser in its early phase (Clarke et al., 1980) and Jacques Lacan (Macey, 1988; Roudinesco, 1990, pp. 35-58, 377-78) in its later manifestations. It has also become increasingly bound up with the discipline of cultural studies (Grossberg et al., 1992; During, 1993). I am not the right person to attempt an exposition of it. Whatever else can be said of it, it is post-Marxist and therefore outside of my remit. There is no doubt, however, that this is a path which has been taken by many structuralist Marxists and which has led them away from transformative politics.

The main features characterising Marxist approaches to biology, evolution and psychology are the interpenetration of natural and human categories, the role of the environment and of social forces and the deep embedding of prevailing ideological forces in the motivations of the human subject. The biggest problem for a Marxist psychology is how to account for the origin and sustenance of revolutionary insight and energy.

Standing back and reflecting on Marxist approaches to the concepts of evolution, biology and psychology in the broadest terms, the task is to reconcile the social construction of nature and human nature as an essentially determinist idea based on the detailed analysis of the relevant determinations, on the one hand, with the transformative idea of praxis — whereby nature and human nature are seen as planned, willed, visionary projects — an essentially voluntarist idea of revolutionary transformation, on the other. Looking more generally at Marxist approaches to nature, science and human nature, there is much that remains to be conceptualised. As befits a tradition committed to historicity, this is the ongoing project of a number of periodicals: Science and Society, which began in the 1930s and still appears; Radical Science Journal (1974-1986), renamed Science as Culture (1987-) which also gave birth to Free Associations: Psychoanalysis, Groups, Politics, Groups, Culture (1984-). The rise of ecological and environmental concerns has led to new Marxist approaches to these issues: Capitalism, Nature, Socialism: A Journal of Socialist Ecology (1988); Society and Nature: The International Journal of Political Ecology (1992).

A passage from Bukharin’s essay in the epoch-making Soviet collection, Science at the Cross-Roads, embodies a subtle combination of the approaches to nature, science and human nature which are distinctively Marxist. In particular, it illustrates how matters of psychology penetrate into the philosophies of history, of science and of nature in Marxist theory and practice: ‘At the present time all scientists more or less acquainted with the facts, and all research workers, recognise that genetically theory grew up out of practice, and that any branch of science has, in the long run, its practical roots. From the standpoint of social development, science or theory is the continuation of practice, but — to adapt the well-known remark of Clausewitz — "by other means". The function of science, in the sum total of the process of reproduction of social life, is the function of orientation in the external world and in society, the function of extending and deepening practice, increasing its effectiveness, the function of a peculiar struggle with nature, with the elemental progress of social development, with the classes hostile to the given socio-historical order. The idea of the self-sufficient character of science ("science for Science’s sake") is naive: it confuses the subjective passions of the professional scientist, working in a system of profound division of labour, in conditions of a disjointed society, in which individual social functions are crystallised in a diversity of types, psychologies, passions (as Schiller says: "science is a goddess, not a milch cow"), with the objective social role of this kind of activity, as an activity of vast practical importance. The fetishising of science, as of other phenomena of social life, and the deification of the corresponding categories is a perverted ideological reflex of a society in which the division of labour has destroyed the visible connection between the social function, separating them out in the consciousness of their agents as absolute and sovereign values. Yet any — even the most abstract — branch of science has a quite definite vital importance in the course of historical development. Naturally it is not a question of the direct practical importance of any individual principle — e.g., in the sphere of the theory of numbers or the doctrine of quantities, or the theory of conditioned reflexes. It is a question of systems as a whole, of appropriate activity, of chains of scientific truths, representing in the long run the theoretical expression of the "struggle for existence" and the social struggle’ (Bukharin, 1931, pp. 19-21).

 

A slightly abbreviated version of this essay appeared in Psychology and Society: Radical Theory and Practice, edited by Ian Parker and Russell Spears, Pluto Press, 1996, pp. 35-49

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(Place of publication is London unless otherwise specified.)

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Address for correspondence: 26 Freegrove Road, London N7 9RQ

e-mail: robert@rmy1.demon.co.uk


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