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A Hypertext view on PSYCOLOQUY

base-rate

1. koehler, 4(49)
   
2. gregson, WHICH BAYESIAN THEOREM COULD BE COMPARED WITH REAL BEHAVIOUR? Commentary on Koehler on Base-Rate 4(50)
   
3. koonce, BASE-RATE USAGE IN ACCOUNTING Commentary on Koehler on Base-Rate 4(51)
   
4. spellman, IMPLICIT LEARNING OF BASE RATES Commentary on Koehler on Base-Rate 4(61)
   
5. ayton, BASE RATE NEGLECT: AN INSIDE VIEW OF JUDGMENT? Commentary on Koehler on Base-Rate 4(63)
   
6. mckenzie, BASE RATES VERSUS PRIOR BELIEFS IN BAYESIAN INFERENCE Commentary on Koehler on Base-Rate 5(01)
   
7. hamm, UNDERWEIGHTING OF BASE-RATE INFORMATION REFLECTS IMPORTANT DIFFICULTIES PEOPLE HAVE WITH PROBABILISTIC INFERENCE Commentary on Koehler on Base-Rate 5(03)
   
8. mccauley, STEREOTYPES AS BASE RATE PREDICTIONS Commentary on Koehler on Base-Rate 5(05)
   
9. koehler, BASE RATES AND THE "ILLUSION ILLUSION" Reply to Ayton, Gregson, Hamm, Koonce, McCauley, McKenzie & Spellman on Koehler on Base-Rates 5(09)
   
10. fletcher, ASSESSING ERROR IN SOCIAL JUDGMENT Commentary on Koehler on Base-Rate 5(10)
    
11. macchi, ON THE COMMUNICATION AND COMPREHENSION OF PROBABILISTIC INFORMATION Commentary on Koehler on Base-Rate 5(11)
    
12. funder, JUDGMENTAL PROCESS AND CONTENT Commentary on Koehler on Base-Rate 5(17)
    
13. koehler, FALLACY UNDER FIRE: ROUND 2 Reply to Fletcher, Funder and Macchi on Base-rate 5(21)
    
14. wells-windschitl, WHEN IS THE USE OF BASE-RATE INFORMATION NOT A LOGICAL IMPERATIVE? Commentary on Koehler on Base-rates 5(33)
    

brain-rhythms

1. pulvermueller, 5(48)
   
2. miller, COGNITIVE PROCESSING, BUT NOT CELL ASSEMBLY IGNITION Commentary on Pulvermueller et al. on Brain-Rhythms 5(50)
   
3. goertzel, PERIODIC BRAIN RESPONSES AND BEYOND Commentary on Pulvermueller et al. on Brain-Rhythms 5(51)
   
4. klimesch, THE IGNITION OF CORTICAL CELL ASSEMBLIES: SOME ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE ASSUMPTION OF A SELECTIVE INCREASE IN GAMMA BAND POWER Commentary on Pulvermueller et al. on Brain-Rhythms 5(58)
   
5. mueller, WORD PROCESSING AND GAMMA BAND ACTIVITY Commentary on Pulvermueller et al. on Brain-Rhythms 5(60)
   
6. pulvermueller, WHY CELL ASSEMBLY IGNITION SHOULD LEAD TO GAMMA BAND RESPONSES Reply to Miller on Brain-Rhythms 5(65)
   
7. pulvermueller, SIMPLE MODELS FIRST Reply to Goertzel on Brain-Rhythms 5(66)
   
8. pulvermueller, INCREASED GAMMA POWER: NEW DATA AGAINST OLD PREJUDICES Reply to Klimesch on Brain-Rhythms 5(67)
   
9. pulvermueller, SPECIFIC GAMMA-BAND DEPRESSION AND LINGUISTIC UNITS Reply to Mueller & Jokeit on Brain-Rhythms 5(68)
   

categorization

1. murre, Precis of: LEARNING AND CATEGORIZATION IN MODULAR NEURAL NETWORKS JMJ Murre 1992, 244 pages Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf (In Canada and the USA: Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum) 3(68)
   
2. hardcastle, WHAT COUNTS AS PLAUSIBLE? Book Review of Murre on Categorization 4(26)
   
3. gregson, NETWORKS THAT RESPECT PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY Book Review of Murre on Categorization 4(27)
   
4. krakauer, EVOLUTION, LEARNING & CATEGORIZATION Book Review of Murre on Categorization 4(28)
   
5. sloman, MODULARITY OF MIND: A QUESTION UNASKED Book Review of Murre on Categorization 4(29)
   
6. levenick, A WELCOME CHANGE FROM BACK-PROPAGATION MODELS OF COGNITION Book Review of Murre on Categorization 4(35)
   
7. powers, CALM, CHAOS AND SURPRISE! Book Review of Murre on Categorization 4(36)
   
8. murre, CAN WE MODEL THE ARCHITECTURE OF COGNITION? Reply to Hardcastle, Gregson, Krakauer & Houston, Sloman on Categorization 4(44)
   
9. pickering, KEEPING CALM ABOUT NEURAL NETWORKS Book Review of Murre on Categorization 4(46)
   
10. aitken, HAVE MODULE, NEED ARCHITECTURE! Book Review of Murre on Categorization 4(47)
    
11. sutton, MODULARITY: WHAT HAS BEEN LEARNED? Book Review of Murre on Categorization 4(53)
    
12. cho, EXPLOITING MODULARITY IN NEURAL NETWORKS Book Review of Murre on Categorization 5(61)
    

consciousness

1. bridgeman, 3(15)
   
2. andreae, Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(17)
   
3. bridgeman, Reply to Andreae on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(18)
   
4. barlow, 3(19)
   
5. bridgeman, Reply to Barlow on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(20)
   
6. fielding, Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(21)
   
7. bridgeman, Reply to Fielding on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(22)
   
8. laming, 3(23)
   
9. bridgeman, Response to Laming on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(24)
   
10. murre, Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(25)
    
11. bridgeman, Reply to Murre on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(26)
    
12. noble, Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(27)
    
13. bridgeman, Reply to Noble on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(28)
    
14. rosenthal, CONSCIOUSNESS, PLANS, AND LANGUAGE: Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(32)
    
15. bridgeman, CONSCIOUSNESS AND MEMORY: Reply to Rosenthal on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(33)
    
16. velmans, CONSCIOUSNESS AND PLANNING: Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(34)
    
17. bridgeman, CONSCIOUSNESS: WHAT'S THE USE? Reply to Velmans on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(35)
    
18. wasserman, ESSENTIALISM AND CONSCIOUSNESS: Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(36)
    
19. bridgeman, ON DEFINING CONSCIOUSNESS: Reply to Wasserman on Bridgeman 3(37)
    
20. zelazo, THE DISSOCIATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE CONTROL OF BEHAVIOR Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(38)
    
21. bridgeman, THE CO-DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND PLANNING Reply to Zelazo on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(39)
    
22. reidbord, WOULD YOU CHOOSE UNREMEMBERED PAIN? Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(41)
    
23. bridgeman, VARIETIES OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE Reply to Reidbord on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(42)
    
24. barlow, CONSCIOUSNESS AND CULTURE Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(43)
    
25. mcgovern, Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(47)
    
26. rickert, CONSCIOUSNESS AND SIMULATION Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(48)
    
27. bridgeman, MENTAL LIFE AS SIMULATION Reply to Rickert on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(50)
    
28. bridgeman, PLANNING TO PLAN: ITERATIVE BRAIN FUNCTION Reply to McGovern/Baars on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(53)
    
29. enright, HAS CONSCIOUSNESS BECOME A SOLUBLE PROBLEM? Commentary on Bridgeman on Consciousness 3(54)
    

data-archive

1. skoyles, John R. Skoyles Department of Psychology University College London WC1E 6BT, UK ucjtprs@ucl.ac.uk 3(29)
   
2. graham, PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY OF ELECTRONICALLY ARCHIVED DATA Commentary on Skoyles on Data-Archiving 3(55)
   
3. gelobter, PUBLIC DATA-ARCHIVING: A FAIR RETURN ON PUBLICLY FUNDED RESEARCH Commentary on Skoyles on Data-Archiving 3(56)
   
4. jennings, ENDORSEMENT OF FTP INTERNET ARCHIVING OF DATA Commentary on Skoyles on Data-Archiving 3(57)
   

eeg-chaos

1. wright, 4(60)
   
2. gregson, THINKING ABOUT THE UNCONSIDERED CHAOTIC EEG DATA Commentary on Wright et al. on EEG-Chaos 5(06)
   
3. tsuda, FROM MICRO-CHAOS TO MACRO-CHAOS: CHAOS CAN SURVIVE EVEN IN MACROSCOPIC STATES OF NEURAL ACTIVITIES Commentary on Wright et al. on EEG-Chaos 5(12)
   
4. goertzel, FROM NEURONS TO NEURONAL GROUPS Commentary on Wright et al. on EEG-Chaos 5(13)
   
5. wright, NOISE IS CRUCIAL TO EEG DYNAMICS Reply to Gregson, Goertzel & Tsuda 5(19)
   
6. nunez, NEOCORTICAL DYNAMICS AND EEG Commentary on Wright, Kydd & Liley on EEG-Chaos 5(20)
   
7. wright, EEG SIMULATION IS NOT METAPHOR Reply to Nunez on EEG-Chaos 5(24)
   
8. erwin, ON CHAOTIC EEG DYNAMICS Commentary on Wright, Kydd & Liley on EEG-chaos 5(34)
   

evolution-thinking

1. sheets-johnstone, Precis of: THE ROOTS OF THINKING Temple University Press 1990 15 chapters, 389 pages 5(08)
   
2. steele, HOMINID SENSORY MODALITIES AND PALAEOLITHIC DATA Book Review of Sheets-Johnstone on Evolution-Thinking 5(27)
   
3. lemmen, TAKING EXPERIENCES SERIOUSLY Book Review of Sheets-Johnstone on Evolution-Thinking 5(28)
   
4. webster, SENSORY MODALITIES AND CONCEPT FORMATION Commentary on Sheets-Johnstone on Evolution-Thinking 5(31)
   
5. sheets-johnstone, PALEOLITHIC CAVE ART: THE TACTILE-KINESTHETIC VS. THE VISUAL MODALITY Reply to Steele on Evolution-Thinking 5(52)
   
6. sheets-johnstone, CORPOREAL REPRESENTATION AND CORPOREAL SENSE-MAKING Reply to Webster on Evolution-Thinking 5(53)
   
7. sheets-johnstone, COGNITIVE IMPLICATIONS OF TACTILE-KINESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND INVARIANTS Reply to Lemmen on Evolution-Thinking 5(54)
   
8. grossenbacher, ENIGMAS OF THE BODY, SENSE MODALITIES AND SPACE PERCEPTION Book Review of Sheets-Johnstone on Evolution-Thinking 5(55)
   
9. sheets-johnstone, METHODOLOGY AND TACTILE-KINESTHETIC EXPERIENCE Reply to Grossenbacher on Evolution-Thinking 5(72)
   

fodor-representation

1. wallis, ASYMMETRIC DEPENDENCE AND MENTAL REPRESENTATION 3(70)
   
2. pietroski, FODOR UNSCATHED Commentary on Wallis on Fodor-Representation 4(10)
   
3. dewitt, REPRESENTATION AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE Commentary on Wallis on Fodor-Representation 4(11)
   
4. wallis, MENTAL REPRESENTATION AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE Reply to DeWitt and to Pietroski on Wallis on Fodor-Representation 4(18)
   
5. mortensen, REPRESENTATION AND CAUSAL ASYMMETRY Commentary on Wallis on Fodor-Representation 4(19)
   
6. wallis, COUNTERFACTUALS, ASYMMETRY, AND REPRESENTATION Reply to Mortensen & O'Brien on Fodor-Representation 4(45)
   

frame-problem

1. ford+hayes, SUMMARY OF: Kenneth M. Ford and Patrick J. Hayes (Eds.) (1991) Reasoning Agents in a Dynamic World: The Frame Problem JAI Press, Greenwich CT, 289 pages, ISBN 1-55938-082-9 3(59)
   
2. vanbrakel, THE COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF THE FRAME PROBLEM Book Review of Ford & Hayes on the Frame-Problem 3(60)
   
3. freeman, FRAMING IS A DYNAMIC PROCESS Commentary on Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem 3(62)
   
4. fetzer, 4(14)
   
5. ford+hayes, EFFECTIVE DESCRIPTIONS NEED NOT BE COMPLETE Reply to Van Brakel on Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem 4(21)
   
6. ford+hayes, PROBLEMS WITH FRAMES Reply to Freeman on Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem 4(22)
   
7. vanbrakel, UNJUSTIFIED COHERENCE. Commentary on Fetzer on van Brakel on Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem 4(23)
   
8. grush, VAN BRAKEL'S POSITION IS PERFECTLY COHERENT Commentary on Fetzer on van Brakel on Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem 4(24)
   
9. morris, THE CHANGING SCENE Book Review of Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem 4(25)
   
10. fetzer, PHILOSOPHY UNFRAMED Reply to Van Brakel, Grush, and Morris on the Frame Problem 4(33)
    
11. harnad, PROBLEMS, PROBLEMS: THE FRAME PROBLEM AS A SYMPTOM OF THE SYMBOL GROUNDING PROBLEM Commentary on Van Brakel and Fetzer on Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem 4(34)
    
12. ford+hayes, MODELING OUR ADAPTIVE INTELLIGENCE, NOT GOD'S Reply to Fetzer on Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem 4(42)
    

frontal-cortex

1. neafsey, FRONTAL CORTEX, THE MIND, AND THE BODY Commentary on Abbruzzeze et al. on Frontal-Cortex 4(15)
   
2. henderson, DECOMPOSING THE CORPUS OF NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS Commentary on Abbruzzese et al. on Frontal-Cortex 4(32)
   
3. abbruzzese, IS IT POSSIBLE TO STUDY BRAIN-MIND RELATIONSHIPS IN PSYCHIATRY? Reply to Neafsey and Henderson & Dittrich on Frontal-Cortex 4(43)
   
4. abbruzzese, FRONTAL LOBE DYSFUNCTION IN MENTAL ILLNESS 4(9)
   

human-animal-bond

1. davis, Precis of: THE INEVITABLE BOND Hank Davis & Dianne Balfour (eds.) (1992) 24 Chapters, 399 pgs; Cambridge University Press 4(12)
   
2. bekoff, SHOULD SCIENTISTS BOND WITH THE ANIMALS WHO THEY USE? WHY NOT? Book Review of Davis & Balfour on Human-Animal-Bond 4(37)
   
3. shapiro, SCIENTIST-ANIMAL BOND: BETTER LATE THAN NEVER Book Review of Davis & Balfour on Human Animal Bond 4(38)
   
4. faulkes, WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN? OUR ANIMALS AND OURSELVES Book Review of Davis & Balfour on Human-Animal Bond 4(40)
   
5. innis, WHY BOND? Book Review of Davis & Balfour on Human-Animal Bond 4(41)
   
6. zentall, EXPERIMENTER-SUBJECT INTERACTION: A FRESH APPROACH Book Review of Davis & Balfour on Human-Animal Bond 4(48)
   
7. davis, A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO "THE INEVITABLE BOND" WAS NOT INEVITABLE Response to Multiple Book Reviews of Human-Animal Bond 4(54)
   

language-comprehension

1. gernsbacher, Precis of: LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION AS STRUCTURE BUILDING MA Gernsbacher (1990) Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 3(69)
   
2. powers, TIME AS A WINDOW ON COMPREHENSION Book Review of Gernsbacher on Comprehension 4(39)
   
3. straight, A PROMISING MODEL OF SENTENCE CONSTRUAL Book Review of Gernsbacher on Language-Comprehension 5(37)
   
4. riesbeck, LANGUAGE UNDERSTANDING IS RECOGNITION, NOT CONSTRUCTION Book Review of Gernsbacher on Language-Comprehension 5(38)
   
5. osborne, WORDS FIRST, THEORY LATER Book Review of Gernsbacher on Language Comprehension 5(64)
   

language-network

1. miikkulainen, CALL FOR BOOK REVIEWERS 5(46)
   
2. goertzel, HIERARCHICAL FEATURE MAPS AND BEYOND Book review of Miikkulainen on Language-Network 5(56)
   
3. edelman, BIOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE REPRESENTATION OF STRUCTURE IN VISION AND LANGUAGE Book Review of Miikkulainen on Language-Network 5(57)
   
4. deane, NARROWING THE GAP: MIIKKULAINEN AND THE CONNECTIONIST MODELING OF LINGUISTIC COMPETENCE Book Review of Miikkulainen on Language-Network 5(77)
   
5. reilly, DISCERN AS A COGNITIVE MODEL AND COGNITIVE MODELLING FRAMEWORK Book Review of Miikkulainen on Language-Network 5(78)
   
6. dror, THE ROLE OF NEURAL NETWORKS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE: EVOLUTION OR REVOLUTION? Book Review of Miikkulainen on Language-Network 5(79)
   
7. miikkulainen, STORAGE AND REORGANIZATION IN EPISODIC MEMORY Reply to Goertzel on Language-Network 5(85)
   
8. miikkulainen, REPRESENTATION OF STRUCTURE ON LINGUISTIC MAPS Reply to Edelman on Language-Network 5(86)
   
9. kentridge, MODULARITY OF MIND, CEREBRAL LOCALISATION AND CONNECTIONIST NEUROPSYCHOLOGY Book Review of Miikkulainen on Language-Network 5(87)
   
10. cooper, REPRESENTATION IN MODULAR NETWORKS Book review of Miikkulainen on Language-Network 5(88)
    

least-squares

1. bookstein, 5(23)
   

metapsychology

1. rakover, Precis of: METAPSYCHOLOGY: MISSING LINKS IN BEHAVIOR, MIND, AND SCIENCE New York: Paragon/Solomon (1990) 449 pp. ISBN 1-55778-036-6 4(55)
   
2. flaten, WHAT IS MEANT BY "REDUCTIONISM"? Book Review of Rakover on Metapsychology 5(04)
   
3. hardcastle, METAPSYCHOLOGY FOR THE MASSES? Book Review of Rakover on Metapsychology 5(14)
   
4. hyland, METHODOLOGICAL COMPLEMENTARITY AND THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM Book review of Rakover on Metapsychology 5(16)
   
5. chow, THEORY-DATA RELATIONS AND THEORY ACCEPTANCE Book Review of Rakover on Metapsychology 5(25)
   
6. burghardt, EVOLUTION AND THE ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE EXPERIENCE Book Review of Rakover on Metapsychology 5(73)
   
7. fletcher, THE MISSING LINKS Book Review of Rakover on Metapsychology 5(74)
   
8. rakover, METAPSYCHOLOGY: MIND-BODY AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS Reply to Flaten, Hardcastle, Hyland, and Chow 5(81)
   

mood

1. dow, 3(1)
   
2. nesse, 3(10)
   
3. plutchik, 3(11)
   
4. nesse, 3(12)
   
5. nesse, 3(2)
   
6. sloman, 3(3)
   
7. nesse, 3(4)
   
8. morris, 3(7)
   
9. nesse, 3(8)
   
10. mancuso, 3(9)
    

paradoxical-cognition

1. navon, 5(36)
   
2. wegner, PINK ELEPHANT TRAMPLES WHITE BEAR: THE EVASION OF SUPPRESSION Commentary on Navon on Paradoxical Cognition 5(40)
   
3. navon, PARADOXICAL EFFECTS AND OCCAM'S RAZOR Reply to Wegner on Paradoxical Cognition 5(41)
   

pattern-recognition

1. nigrin, Precis of: NEURAL NETWORKS FOR PATTERN RECOGNITION Albert Nigrin (1993) 8 chapters, 413 pages, Cambridge MA: The MIT Press 5(02)
   
2. dacosta, A NONMYSTIFYING APPROACH TO ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS Book review of Nigrin on Pattern Recognition 5(15)
   
3. nigrin, A FRAMEWORK FOR AUTONOMOUS PATTERN RECOGNITION Reply to Da Costa on Pattern-Recognition 5(26)
   
4. rickert, A BROADER PERSPECTIVE TO NEURAL NETWORKS Book Review of Nigrin on Pattern Recognition 5(29)
   
5. marshall, SYNONYMS, EMBEDDING, SEGMENTATION, AND THE BANANA PROBLEM Book review of Nigrin on Pattern Recognition 5(32)
   
6. pickering, NEURAL NETS CANNOT LIVE BY THOUGHT (EXPERIMENTS) ALONE Book Review of Nigrin on Pattern Recognition 5(35)
   
7. nigrin, CONTEXT SENSITIVITY AND REINFORCEMENT LEARNING Reply to Rickert on Pattern Recognition 5(42)
   
8. nigrin, GEDANKEN EXPERIMENTS AND SONNET Reply to Pickering on Pattern Recognition 5(47)
   
9. page, REAL PROGRESS IN NEURAL MODELLING: FROM A NODE TO A SONNET Book Review of Nigrin on Pattern-Recognition 5(75)
   

pavlov-bell

1. littman, BEKHTEREV AND WATSON RANG PAVLOV'S BELL: A REPLY TO CATANIA'S QUERY 5(49)
   
2. thomas, PAVLOV USED A BELL Commentary on Littman on Pavlov-Bell 5(63)
   
3. davis, PAVLOV'S BELL-LESS STATUS MAY STILL BE INTACT Commentary on Littman on Pavlov-Bell 5(76)
   
4. thomas, PAVLOV'S DOGS "DRIPPED SALIVA AT THE SOUND OF A BELL" Commentary on Littman on Pavlov-Bell 5(80)
   

peer-review

1. stodolsky, INVITATIONAL JOURNALS BASED UPON EDITORIAL CONSENSUS: A NEW EDITORIAL ROLE IN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL PUBLICATION 3(67)
   

reading

1. cassidy, 3(13)
   
2. skoyles, 3(14)
   
3. cassidy, 3(5)
   
4. skoyles, 3(6)
   
5. small, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF WRITING AND READING Commentary on Skoyles on Reading 3(61)
   
6. hartley, THE VISUAL CHUNKING OF TEXT Commentary on Small on Skoyles on Reading 3(66)
   
7. small, VISUAL DISPLAY OF TEXT AFFECTS VISUAL DISPLAY OF RECALL: EVIDENCE FROM ANTIQUITY Commentary on Hartley on Small on Skoyles on Reading 4(20)
   

reading-inference

1. singer, MINIMALISM: A HEDGED ANALYSIS OF RESTRICTED INFERENCE PROCESSING Commentary on Garnham and on Glenberg & Mathew on Reading-Inference 4(1)
   
2. garnham, DICHOTOMY OR NOT DICHOTOMY?: THAT IS THE QUESTION Reply to Keenan on Garnham on Reading-Inference 4(16)
   
3. garnham, AN IMPARTIAL VIEW OF INFERENCE MAKING Reply to Zwaan & Graesser on Garnham on Reading-Inference 4(17)
   
4. keenan, THOUGHTS ABOUT THE MINIMALIST HYPOTHESIS Commentary on Garnham on Reading-Inference 4(2)
   
5. zwaan, READING GOALS AND SITUATION MODELS Commentary on Glenberg & Mathew on Reading-Inference 4(3)
   
6. garnham, SPACE: THE FINAL FRONTIER? Reply to Haberlandt on Garnham on Reading-Inference 4(30)
   
7. glenberg, COMPREHENSION WHILE MISSING THE POINT: MORE ON MINIMALISM AND MODELS Reply to Carreiras, Fernandez & Carriedo, Haberlandt and Zwaan & Graesser on Glenberg & Mathew on Reading-Inference 4(31)
   
8. zwaan, THERE IS NO EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE THAT SOME INFERENCES ARE AUTOMATICALLY OR PARTIALLY ENCODED IN TEXT COMPREHENSION Commentary on Garnham on Reading-Inference 4(4)
   
9. haberlandt, UNDERSTANDING MENTAL MODELS AND INFERENCES Commentary on Garnham and on Glenberg & Mathew on Reading-Inference 4(5)
   
10. carreiras, MINIMALIST MISCONCEPTIONS OF MENTAL MODELS Commentary on Garnham and on Glenberg & Mathews on Reading-Inference 4(6)
    
11. fernandez, READING COMPREHENSION: IN DEFENSE OF A MENTAL MODEL APPROACH Commentary on G&M on Reading-Inference 4(7)
    
12. noordman, A MORE PARSIMONIOUS VERSION OF MINIMALISM IN INFERENCES Commentary on Garnham on Reading-Inference 4(8)
    

reading-inference-1

1. garnham, MINIMALISM VERSUS CONSTRUCTIONISM: A FALSE DICHOTOMY IN THEORIES OF INFERENCE DURING READING 3(63)
   
2. glenberg-mathew, WHEN MINIMALISM IS NOT ENOUGH: MENTAL MODELS IN READING COMPREHENSION 3(64)
   

robot-consciousness

1. bringsjord, CALL FOR BOOK REVIEWERS 5(59)
   
2. tirassa, IS CONSCIOUSNESS NECESSARY TO HIGH-LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEMS? Book Review of Bringsjord on Robot-Consciousness 5(82)
   
3. brown, AGNOSTICISM ABOUT THE ARBITRARY REALIZATION ARGUMENT Book Review of Bringsjord on Robot-Consciousness 5(83)
   
4. scholl, INTUITIONS, AGNOSTICISM, AND CONSCIOUS ROBOTS Book review of Bringsjord on Robot-Consciousness 5(84)
   

scientific-cognition

1. giere, CALL FOR BOOK REVIEWERS 4(56)
   
2. bookstein, GEOMETRY AS COGNITION IN THE NATURAL SCIENCES Commentary on Giere on Science-Cognition 4(65)
   
3. vanbrakel, COGNITIVE SCIENTISM OF SCIENCE Commentary on Giere on Science-Cognition 5(07)
   
4. shafto, WHAT CAN INSIDERS LEARN FROM OUTSIDERS? Book review of Giere on Scientific Cognition 5(30)
   
5. catania, INFORMATION, COGNITION AND BEHAVIOR: TELLING WHAT THEY WANT TO HEAR Book Review of Giere on Scientific Cognition 5(39)
   
6. hardcastle, WHY DON'T WE YET HAVE A COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF SCIENCE? Book review of Giere on Scientific Cognition 5(43)
   
7. roitblat, A REPRESENTATIONAL VIEW OF SCIENCE Book review of Giere on Scientific Cognition 5(44)
   
8. slater, WHY WE SHOULD NOT RELY ON COGNITIVE SCIENCE TO UNIFY PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Book review of Giere on Scientific Cognition 5(45)
   
9. giere, COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: WHAT'S THE CONNECTION? Reply to Bookstein, Catania, Hardcastle, Roitblat, Shafto, Slater & van Brakel on Scientific-Cognition 5(62)
   
10. klahr, SEARCHING FOR COGNITION IN COGNITIVE MODELS OF SCIENCE Book Review of Giere on Scientific-Cognition 5(69)
    
11. fuller, COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF SCIENCE: THE WAVE OF THE FUTURE OR A BLAST FROM THE PAST? Reply to Bookstein, Catania, Hardcastle, Roitblat, Shafto, Slater & van Brakel on Scientific-Cognition 5(70)
    
12. dittrich, COGNITION FOR SCIENCE? Book Review of Giere on Scientific Cognition 5(71)
    

space

1. bryant, 3(16)
   
2. phillips, Commentary on Bryant on Space 3(30)
   
3. bryant, Reply to Phillips on Bryant on Space 3(31)
   
4. franklin, Commentary on Bryant on Space 3(40)
   
5. bryant, Reply to Franklin on Bryant on Space 3(44)
   
6. brugman, Commentary on Bryant on Space 3(45)
   
7. velichkovsky, A SINGLE SYSTEM OF PERCEPTUAL-VERBAL ACCESS? Commentary on Bryant on Space 3(46)
   
8. bryant, HOW MANY SPATIAL SYSTEMS? Reply to Velichkovsky on Bryant on Space 3(49)
   
9. bryant, LEXICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO SPATIAL REPRESENTATION Reply to Brugman on Bryant on Space 3(51)
   
10. montello, CHARACTERISTICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL SPATIAL COGNITION Commentary on Bryant on Space 3(52)
    
11. bryant, REPRESENTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE SPATIAL REPRESENTATION SYSTEM Reply to Montello on Bryant on Space 3(58)
    
12. presson, MULTIPLE MENTAL MODELS Commentary on Bryant on Space 3(65)
    
13. bryant, MULTIPLE FRAMES OF REFERENCE Reply to Presson and Roepnack on Bryant on Space 4(13)
    

split-brain

1. puccetti, 4(52)
   
2. hardcastle, A NEW AGENDA FOR STUDYING CONSCIOUSNESS Commentary on Puccetti on Split-Brain 4(57)
   
3. leiber, CONSCIENCE AND COMMISSUROTOMY Commentary on Puccetti on Split-Brain 4(58)
   
4. revonsuo, DENNETT AND DISSOCIATIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS Commentary on Puccetti on Split-Brain 4(59)
   
5. mortensen, DISTINCTIONS: SUBPERSONAL AND SUBCONSCIOUS Commentary on Puccetti on Split-Brain 4(62)
   
6. pessin, ONE MIND TOO MANY? Commentary on Puccetti on Split-Brain 4(64)
   
7. puccetti, NARRATIVE RICHNESS AS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR THE SELF Reply to Hardcastle, Leiber, Mortensen et al., Pessin & Revonsuo 5(18)
   
8. webster, Collingwood and Vygotsky on Consciousness Commentary on Puccetti on Split-brain 5(22)
   

Rutgers University Research Group on Evolution and Higher Cognition

Publications

Contents


Mindreading
Pretense
Rationality
Mental Disorders
Social Construction
Moral Cognition


Mindreading

Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory?

Second Thoughts on Simulation

Varieties of Off-Line Simulation

Choice Effects and the Ineffectiveness of Simulation

Theory Theory to the Max

Cognitive Penetrability, Rationality and Restricted Simulation

Rethinking Co-cognition

Reading One's Own Mind


Pretense
A Cognitive Theory of Pretense


Rationality
Rethinking Rationality

Ending the Rationality Wars


Mental Disorders

Griffiths, Elimination and Psychopathology

Darwin in the Madhouse


Social Construction

The Odd Couple: The Compatibility of Social Construction and Evolutionary Psychology



Moral Cognition

Moral Philosophy and Mental Representation

Mindreading and the Core Architecture of Moral Psychology

Full Text Articles on Primates

http://www.fsu.edu/Panama/ipsp/fulltext.htm

International Primate Sanctuary Panama

http://www.fsu.edu/Panama/ipsp

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Online papers on consciousness  

Compiled by David Chalmers  

This is a directory of 483 online papers on consciousness and related topics.   Suggestions for addition are welcome. (N.B. most papers are by academic philosophers or scientists.)

For other sources of online papers, and for bibliographies of around 2000 offline papers, see: 

• individuals with online papers in philosophy 
• web resources related to consciousness, philosophy, and such 
• directory of online philosophy papers (Joe Lau)
• Consciousness in Philosophy: A Bibliography
• Consciousness in Science: A Bibliography

TABLE OF CONTENTS

• The concept of consciousness [15 papers]
• The explanatory gap [21]
• Materialism and dualism [25]
• Materialism and modality [11]
• Metaphysics of consciousness [20]
• Panpsychism [8]
• Zombies [16]
• Qualia [16]
• Consciousness and content[22]
• The function of consciousness [10]
• The self and personal identity [24]
• Philosophy of consciousness (misc.) [19]
• Mental content [33]
• Philosophy of mind (misc.) [21]
  
  
• Consciousness and artificial intelligence [13]
• The Chinese Room [12]
• Godel's theorem and AI [20]
• The Turing test [16]
• Philosophy of AI (misc.) [15]
  
  
• Neuroscience of visual consciousness [9]
• Consciousness and neuroscience [20]
• Cognitive models of consciousness [24]
• Unconscious perception [10]
• Implicit memory [13]
• Implicit learning [7]
• Consciousness and attention [8]
• Consciousness and psychology (misc.) [14]
  
  
• Animal consciousness [8]
• Consciousness and physics [23]
• Methodology [8]
• Miscellaneous [10]

The Concept of Consciousness 

• Ned Block, On a confusion about a function of consciousness
• David Chalmers, Availability: The cognitive basis of experience?
• Eric Gillett, Searle and the "deep unconscious" (and Dan Lloyd's commentary)
• Alvin Goldman, Consciousness, folk psychology, and cognitive science
• Ted Honderich, Consciousness as existence
• Ted Honderich, Consciousness as existence again
• William James, Does `consciousness' exist?
• Eric Lormand, Consciousness
• Eric Lormand, Nonphenomenal consciousness
• Gregory Mulhauser, What is self-awareness?
• David Rosenthal, A theory of consciousness
• David Rosenthal, The kinds of consciousness
• Aaron Sloman, Notes on consciousness
• Aaron Sloman, What is it like to be a rock?

The Explanatory Gap 

• Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker, Conceptual analysis and the explanatory gap
• James Carnie, Relational direct realism as a solution to the hard problem
• David Chalmers, Facing up to the problem of consciousness
• David Chalmers, Moving forward on the problem of consciousness
• David Chalmers, The puzzle of conscious experience
• Patricia Churchland, The hornswoggle problem (and Chalmers' reply)
• Tom Clark, Function and phenomenology: Closing the explanatory gap
• Tom Clark, On the cognitive contingency of consciousness
• Daniel Dennett, Facing backwards on the problem of consciousness (and Chalmers' reply)
• James Garvey, What does McGinn think we cannot know?
• Marion Gothier, Consciousness, science, and the nature of explanation
• James Hopkins, Mind as metaphor: A physicalistic approach to the problem of consciousness
• Steven Horst, Evolutionary explanation and the hard problem of consciousness
• Marc Krellenstein, Unsolvable problems, visual imagery, and explanatory satisfaction
• Eric Lormand, The explanatory stopgap (and appendix)
• Bruce MacLennan, The elements of consciousness and their neurodynamical correlates
• Thomas Nagel, What is it like to be a bat?
• David Papineau, Mind the gap
• David Rosenthal, Reductionism and knowledge
• Max Velmans, The relation of consciousness to the material world

Materialism and Dualism 

• John Beloff, What are minds for?
• John Beloff, The mind-brain problem
• Selmer Bringsjord, Searle on the brink
• Andrew Chrucky, Critique of Wilfrid Sellars' materialism
• Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy
• John Hubbard, Parsimony and the mind
• Frank Jackson, Epiphenomenal qualia
• Edward James, Mind-body continuism: Dualities without dualism
• Peter J. King, Dualism: An empirical test
• E.J. Lowe, Self, agency, and mental causation
• Peter Lloyd, Is the mind physical? Dissecting conscious brain tissue
• Marvin Minsky, Minds are simply what brains do
• Marvin Minsky, Matter, minds, and models
• Barbara Montero, The body problem
• Hans Moravec, Dualism through reductionism
• Paul Moser & J. D. Trout, Contemporary materialism
• Thomas Polger, Escaping the epiphenomenal trap
• Karl Popper, Language and the body-mind problem: A restatement of interactionism
• Karl Popper, A note on the body-mind problem
• David Rosenthal, Dualism
• A.J. Rudd, What it's like and what's really wrong with physicalism: A Wittgensteinian perspective
• Wilfrid Sellars, A note on Popper's argument for dualism
• Nigel Thomas, Mary doesn't know science: On misconceiving a science of consciousness
• Michael Tye, Knowing what it is like: The ability hypothesis and the knowledge argument
• Adam Vinueza, The knowledge argument

Materialism and Modality

• David Chalmers, Materialism and the metaphysics of modality
• David Chalmers, Mind and modality
• David Chalmers, Modal rationalism and the mind-body problem
• Adam Elga, A conceivability argument
• Christopher Hill, Chalmers on the apriority of modal knowledge
• Mark Johnston, It necessarily ain't so
• Brian Loar, Phenomenal states
• Thomas Nagel, Conceiving the impossible and the mind-body problem
• Paul Raymore, A materialist response to David Chalmers' The Conscious Mind
• Stephen Yablo, Concepts and consciousness
• Stephen Yablo, Textbook Kripkeanism and the open texture of language

Metaphysics of Consciousness 

• C.D. Broad, Mind and Its Place in Nature
• Dan Bruiger, The rise and fall of reality
• David Chalmers, Consciousness and cognition
• Craig DeLancey, Empiricism and the query about consciousness
• Fred Dretske, The mind's awareness of itself
• Fergus Duniho, The mind/body problem and its solution
• Ed Feser, Hayek's solution to the mind-body problem
• Ted Honderich, Consciousness, neural functionalism, and real subjectivity
• Ted Honderich, Functionalism, identity theories, the union theory
• Piet Hut & Bas van Fraassen, Elements of reality: A dialogue
• William James, A world of pure experience
• Mark Johnston, The Manifest, Chapter 1 (also Chapter 5, Chapter 7)
• Michael Lockwood, The grain problem
• Colin McGinn, Consciousness and space
• Paul Meehl & Wilfrid Sellars, The concept of emergence
• David Newman, Chaos, emergence, and the mind-body problem
• Gregg Rosenberg, A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World
• Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the philosophy of mind
• Max Velmans, Consciousness, brain, and the physical world
• Max Velmans, Goodbye to reductionism

Panpsychism

• Charles Birch, Why I became a panexperientialist
• Peter Farleigh, Whitehead's even more dangerous idea
• David Ray Griffin, Panexperientialist physicalism and the mind-body problem
• Piet Hut and Roger Shepard, Turning the "hard problem" upside down and sideways
• David Pearce, Cosmic consciousness for tough minds
• David Pearce, Naturalistic panpsychism
• Gregg Rosenberg, Consciousness, causation, and the deep structure of the world
• Gregg Rosenberg, Rethinking nature: On the possibility of a benign panpsychism

Zombies

• Selmer Bringsjord, In defense of impenetrable zombies
• Selmer Bringsjord, The zombie attack on the computational conception of mind
• David Chalmers, Self-ascription without qualia: A case-study
• Allin Cottrell, On the conceivability of zombies: Chalmers v. Dennett
• Daniel Dennett, The unimagined preposterousness of zombies
• Owen Flanagan & Tom Polger, Zombies and the function of consciousness
• Stevan Harnad, Why and how we are not zombies
• Larry Hauser, Revenge of the zombies
• Jaron Lanier, You can't argue with a zombie
• Peter Marton, Zombies vs. materialists: The battle for conceivability
• John McCarthy, Todd Moody's zombies
• Todd Moody, Conversations with zombies
• Gregory Mulhauser, Zombies
• Thomas Polger, Zombies explained
• Nigel Shardlow, Zombies
• Nigel Thomas, Zombie killer 

Qualia 

• Murat Aydede, Naturalism, qualia, and pain
• Murat Aydede, The affective aspect of phenomenal experiences
• Jose Luis Bermudez, Categorizing qualitative states: Some problems
• David Chalmers, Absent qualia, fading qualia, dancing qualia
• David de Leon, The qualities of qualia
• Daniel Dennett, Instead of qualia
• Daniel Dennett, Lovely and suspect qualities
• Daniel Dennett, Quining qualia
• Richard Gregory, Peculiar qualia
• Richard Gregory, What do qualia do?
• Interscience Review, The ontogeny of qualia
• Janet Levin, Qualia
• Eric Lormand, Qualia! (Now showing at a theater near you)
• Ernst Mach, The analysis of sensations
• Eugene Park, Against Dennett's eliminativism: Preserving qualia as a coherent concept
• Sydney Shoemaker, Color, subjective reactions, and qualia
• Sydney Shoemaker, The phenomenal character of experience
• Michael Tye, Qualia

Consciousness and Content

• Kent Bach, Engineering the mind
• Kent Bach, How can experiences find their objects?
• Jose Luis Bermudez, Nonconceptual content: From perceptual experience to subpersonal computational states
• Jose Luis Bermudez and Fiona McPherson, Nonconceptual content and the nature of perceptual experience
• Ned Block, Mental ink
• Peter Carruthers, Conscious thinking: Language or elimination?
• David Chalmers, The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief
• Craig Delancey, Mood and the representational theory of consciousness
• Guven Guzeldere & Murat Aydede, On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties
• Ted Honderich, Seeing things
• Robert Kirk, Why ultra-externalism goes too far
• Brian Loar, Phenomenal intentionality as the basis of mental content
• Eric Lormand, Phenomenal illusions
• Michael Martin, The transparency of experience
• Christopher Peacocke, Conscious attitudes, attention, and self-knowledge
• David Rosenthal, Content, interpretation, and consciousness
• Daniel Stoljar, What what it's like isn't like
• Nigel Thomas, Coding dualism: Conscious thought without Cartesianism or computationalism
• Michael Tye, What what it's like is really like
• Michael Tye, Inverted Earth, Swampman, and representationism
• Wayne Wright, Tye, tree-rings, and representation

The Function of Consciousness

• Bernard Baars, The functions of consciousness
• Ned Block, On a confusion about a function of consciousness
• Selmer Brinsgjord & Ron Noel, Why did evolution engineer consciousness?
• Fred Dretske, What good is consciousness?
• Owen Flanagan & Thomas Polger, Zombies and the function of consciousness
• George Mandler, Consciousness redux
• Thomas Polger & Owen Flanagan, Explaining the evolution of consciousness: The other hard problem
• Thomas Polger & Owen Flanagan, Is consciousness an adaptation?
• Max Velmans, Is human information processing conscious? (plus reply to commentators)

The Self and Personal Identity 

• Jose Luis Bermudez, Aspects of the self: John Campbell's Past, Space, and Self
• Stephen Braude, Multiple personality and moral responsibility (and replies)
• Stephen Clark, Minds, memes, and multiples (and replies)
• Arthur Deikman, `I' = Awareness
• Daniel Dennett, The self as a center of narrative gravity
• Daniel Dennett, The origins of selves
• Grant Gillett, A discursive account of multiple personality disorder (and Stephen Braude's reply)
• Jerry Goodenough, On the methodology of thought experiments
• Valerie Hardcastle & Owen Flanagan, Multiplex vs. multiple selves
• Nicholas Humphrey & Daniel Dennett, Speaking for our selves
• John Locke, Of identity and diversity
• E.J. Lowe, Self, agency, and mental causation
• Max More, The diachronic self
• John Perry, The self
• Roland Puccetti, Dennett on the split brain (and replies)
• David Rosenthal, Emotions and the self
• Brock Sides, Williams on personal identity
• Galen Strawson, The self
• Joe Strout, Mind uploading home page
• Peter Suber, Self-determination and selfhood in recent legal cases

Philosophy of Consciousness (Misc.) 

• Selmer Bringsjord, Explaining phi without Dennett's exotica: Good ol' computation suffices
• Peter Carruthers, Natural theories of consciousness
• David Chalmers, Consciousness and cognition
• Andy Clark, I am John's brain
• Tom Clark, Death, nothingness, and subjectivity
• Daniel Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne, Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain (and reply to commentators)
• Celia Green & Grant Gillett, Are mental events preceded by their physical cases?
• Susan Hurley, Nonconceptual self-consciousness and agency: Perspective and access
• Eric Lormand, Inner sense until proven guilty
• Eric Lormand, Steps toward a science of consciousness?
• Thomas Nagel, The mind wins
• Rafael Nunez, What brain for God's eye? Objectivism, biological naturalism, and Searle
• Gerard O'Brien & Jon Opie, A defense of Cartesian materialism
• Gerard O'Brien & Jon Opie, The disunity of consciousness
• Gregg Rosenberg, The boundary problem for phenomenal individuals
• John Searle, The problem of consciousness
• John Searle, Consciousness and the philosophers (and Chalmers' reply)

Mental Content

• Murat Aydede, Language of thought hypothesis
• Murat Aydede, Syntax, content, and functionalism: What is wrong with the syntactic theory of mind
• Murat Aydede, Fodor on concepts and Frege puzzles
• Jose Luis Bermudez, Naturalism and conceptual norms
• Jose Luis Bermudez, Syntax, semantics, and levels of explanation
• Ned Block, Conceptual role semantics
• Ned Block, Mental and semantic holism
• Paul Boghossian, What the externalist can know a priori
• Jessica Brown, The incompatibility of anti-individualism and priveleged access
• Peter Carruthers, Thinking in language?: Evolution and a modularist possibility
• David Chalmers, The components of content
• Daniel Dennett, Evolution, error, and intentionality
• Danel Dennett, Intentionality
• Daniel Dennett, Real patterns
• Jerry Fodor, There are no recognitional concepts, not even RED (and part 2)
• Rick Grush, Evans on spatial content
• Gilbert Harman, (Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics
• Larry Hauser and Barbara Abbott, Natural language and thought
• Steven Horst, Notions of 'representation' in philosophy and empirical research
• Steven Horst, Symbols and computation: A critique of the computational theory of mind
• Susan Hurley, Vehicles, contents, conceptual structure, and externalism
• Frank Jackson, Learning from Locke on voluntary signs
• Larry Kaye, The language of thought
• Joe Lau, Three motivations for narrow content
• Eric Lormand, How to be a meaning holist (and appendix)
• Eric Lormand, How to be a meaning atomist
• Peter Ludlow, Externalism, self-knowledge, and slow switching (and sequels 1, 2, and 3)
• John Perry, Intentionality and its puzzles
• John Perry and David Israel, Fodor and psychological explanation
• Stephen Schiffer, A paradox of meaning
• Stephen Schiffer, Meanings and concepts
• Robert Stalnaker, What might nonconceptual content be?
• Alberto Voltolini, Internalism and externalism
• Tad Zawidzki, How to criticize Millikan: The problem of mythological content

Philosophy of Mind (Misc.)

• Anthony Atkinson, Persons, systems, and subsystems
• William Bechtel and Jennifer Mundale, Multiple realizability revisited
• Ned Block, Anti-reductionism slaps back
• Ned Block, What is functionalism?
• Andy Clark & David Chalmers, The extended mind
• Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft, Mental simulation and motor imagery
• Martin Davies and Tony Stone, Folk psychology and mental simulation
• Donald Davidson, Anomalous monism
• Hubert Dreyfus, Intelligence without representation
• Alvin Goldman, The psychology of folk psychology
• Rick Grush, Manifolds, co-ordinations, imagination, objectivity
• Steven Horst, Mind and the World of Nature
• Colin McGinn, The problem of philosophy
• Ruth Millikan, What is behavior?
• Tony Pitson, The dispositional account of colour
• Huw Price, Psychology in perspective
• Stephen Stich, Deconstructing the mind
• Nigel Thomas, Are theories of imagery theories of imagination?
• Tim van Gelder, Beyond the mind-body problem
• Tim van Gelder, Monism, dualism, pluralism
• Tim van Gelder, The distinction between mind and cognition
• Rob Wilson, Introduction to philosophy of mind

Consciousness and Artificial Intelligence 

• William Bechtel, Consciousness: Perspectives from symbolic and connectionist AI
• John Beloff, Minds or machines
• Selmer Bringsjord,